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Identity and attribution

In team mode, identity is graph-native: people, organizations, and agents are nodes, and everything that depends on who you are — attribution, routing, per-person queues, review quorums — resolves through edges to those nodes.

Person nodes

Section titled “Person nodes”

A person- node is a member’s identity anchor. Every authenticated token’s canonical subject is a person node, and the {name, email} attribution on a write resolves from that node at read time:

---
id: person-jo
type: person
name: Jo Berge
title: Jo Berge
summary: Backend lead; stewards the tracking-events spec and the webhook path.
email: [email protected]
roles: [reviewer]
date: 2026-05-02
edges:
  - {type: stewards, to: spec-tracking-events}
  - {type: member-of-org, to: org-parcel}
---

The design detail that matters: email is an attribute, not the key. The token binds to the person node’s id; email is a re-pointable field, so changing it re-points attribution and routing instead of severing them. The opaque person- id stays the stable machine reference for edges, filters, and token subjects, while name is the mutable display label.

A few fields do real work:

  • stewards edges declare ownership of an area, spec, or norm — the key question routing walks.
  • roles is the qualification register org policies read: a definition-of-done quorum counts approvals from people holding a named role.
  • queue_mute hides listed projects or nodes from this person’s queue view only.
  • github maps a GitHub login to this person, so reflected PR reviews attach to the right person’s review edges.

Onboarding a teammate is three deliberate steps: author the person node, add their stewards edges, and mint a token bound to the node. Skip the stewards edges and questions in their area route to no one; mint the token before the node exists and their personal queue stays empty. spor whoami (and the bound flag it reports) is the check that a token actually maps to a person node.

Organizations

Section titled “Organizations”

An org- node is a durable organization identity anchor. A person’s member-of-org → org-parcel edge records membership; an additional stewards → org-parcel edge records org-admin authority. Provider roles and email domains confer neither — authority is always an explicit edge in the graph, visible and auditable like everything else.

Agents: person-owned principals

Section titled “Agents: person-owned principals”

An agent- node is a person’s automation principal — the durable identity of a dispatched background session:

---
id: agent-jo-laptop
type: agent
title: Jo's laptop agent
summary: Dispatched-session principal on Jo's laptop; owned by person-jo.
status: active
date: 2026-05-20
edges:
  - {type: owned-by, to: person-jo}
---

An agent node is persistent, typically one per machine or install, created once (spor agent create <label>) and reused across every dispatch — not one node per session. Ownership lives on the owned-by edge, a low-weight structural binding that never pulls the owner into the agent’s work neighborhoods.

Agent on behalf of person

Section titled “Agent on behalf of person”

Work an agent writes is attributed twice, deliberately:

  • author: stays the owning person — so routing, history, per-person queues, and “who did this” all behave exactly as if the person had written it;
  • authored_by_agent: agent-jo-laptop, authored_via: dispatch, and session: <run-id> are added — so you can always tell it was the agent, and which run.

All attribution stamps are derived from the authenticated token, never from the write payload, so they cannot be forged by a caller. The person → agent ownership chain is the audit trail, and it is also a policy boundary: an agent acting on behalf of Jo counts as Jo for the self-approval ban and review quorums, so Jo’s reviewer-agent cannot approve Jo’s implementer-agent’s work past the org bar.

Agent tokens are self-serve and ownership-gated: a person mints short-lived per-session tokens (or a standing token for a headless agent) only for agents they own — no admin privilege involved, and a deleted agent or owner makes the token fail closed rather than impersonate.